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ABSTRACT
The eyes are a valuable source of information for a range of social processes. The
stare-in-the-crowd effect describes the ability to detect self-directed gaze. Impairment in
gaze detection mechanisms, such as the stare-in-the-crowd effect, has implications for
social interactions and development of social relationships. Given the frequency with
which humans utilize gaze detection in interactions, there is a need to better characterize
the stare-in-the-crowd effect. This study utilized a previously validated dynamic visual
paradigm to capture the stare-in-the-crowd effect. We compared typically-developing
(TD) young adults and young adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) on multiple
measures of psychophysiology, including eye tracking and heart rate monitoring. Four
conditions of visual stimuli were presented: averted gaze, mutual gaze, catching another
staring, and getting caught staring. Eye tracking outcomes and arousal (pupil size and
heart rate variability) were compared by diagnosis (TD or ASD) and condition (averted,
mutual, catching another staring, getting caught staring) using repeated measure
ANOVA. Significant interaction of diagnosis and condition was found for IA dwell time,
IA fixation count, and IA second fixation duration. Hierarchical regression was used to
assess how dimensional behavioral measures predicted eye tracking outcomes and
arousal; only two models with advanced theory of mind as a predictor were significant.
Overall, we demonstrated that individuals with ASD do respond differently to various
gaze conditions in similar patterns to TD individuals, but to a lesser extent. This offers
potential targets to social interventions to capitalize on this present but underdeveloped
response to gaze. Implications and future directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background and Significance
Humans are particularly adept at detecting if someone is looking at them in a
crowd of other faces. This “stare-in-the-crowd effect” is implicated in numerous momentto-moment interactions yet relatively little is known about its characteristics. Properly
detecting and reacting to gaze informs social interactions in a unique way. Deficits in this
perceptual system cause an individual to miss out on large amounts of social information.
Thus, study of the stare-in-the-crowd effect is necessary to more completely map social
interactions, and to help identify impairments in those interactions which will inform
intervention development.
The stare-in-the-crowd effect is likely a familiar experience to readers; for
instance, think of a time when you were sitting on a bus and looking up because you “had
a feeling” that someone was looking at you. Your ability to quickly pick out this selfdirected gaze in a sea of faces is an experience of the stare-in-the-crowd effect. Face
scanning experiences occur across age groups and settings. At work, we determine when
to participate in water cooler conversations by initiating eye contact or following the gaze
of others. We glean if someone is referring to a nearby object or person by following and
interpreting their gaze. During recess, the direction of a ringleader’s gaze indicates
whether they are inviting you to play or if you are being excluded.
Both humans and non-human primates are sensitive to this effect. In fact, it has
been posited that the low sclera-iris ratio that is unique to human and non-human
primates evolved expressly to enable quick gaze detection. Why would this be a selective
1

trait? There is a substantial amount of information conveyed through the eyes which, if
not noticed quickly enough or observed long enough, will be lost. In advanced social
societies, it is imperative to use this nonverbal communication to fully engage and
reciprocate in an interaction. Gaze provides categorical information about a potential
conversational partner, their investment in continuing the interaction, extraneous people
or objects referenced in the conversation, and clues about their emotional state (for
review, see Kleinke, 1986). Lack of eye contact in autism spectrum disorder, for instance,
clearly has negative implications for social interactions, partially because abnormal gaze
detection results in missed social information.
1.1.2 Gaze in Social Interactions
Historically, quick identification of self-directed gaze was necessary to assess
whether an approaching human was a friend or foe (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 2001). In
modern times, gaze serves a vital role in quickly accessing social information about
others and identifying their emotions. Due to the large quantity of information coming
from a face, looking at the eye is highly adaptive. Self-directed gaze attracts our own
gaze (Senju & Hasegawa, 2005) and has repeatedly been shown to be more interesting
(as measured by longer looking times) than gaze directed elsewhere (Macrae, Hood,
Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002). Humans also assess others on their use of eye contact.
Maintaining eye contact during social interactions results in being perceived as more
attentive (Breed, 1972; Kelly, 1978), intelligent (Wheeler, Baron, Michell, & Ginsburg,
1979), and pleasant (Cook & Smith, 1975). These relations are not simply a one-to-onecorrelation, however. In most cases, both inconsistent and constant eye contact result in
2

negative perceptions while well-modulated and frequent eye contact results in positive
perceptions.
The duration of eye contact is full of social information as well. Eye contact is the
mechanism through which next steps in a social interaction are conveyed. In the passing
back and forth of the proverbial “talking stick” during a conversation, longer gazes are
used to convey that a speaker has finished what he/she is saying and is waiting for
someone else to respond (Kendon, 1967; Levine & Sutton-Smith, 1973). Breaking eye
contact has been shown to indicate the end of a social interaction (Knapp, Hart, Friedrich,
& Shulman, 1973). The impact of gaze on social interaction also generalizes to other
broader settings, such as the classroom. For instance, it has been found that learning is
enhanced when taught by a teacher initiating frequent gaze and that seating arrangements
in which mutual gaze is encouraged facilitate more cooperative interactions (Jellison &
Ickes, 1974; Otteson & Otteson, 1980).
Gaze is instrumental in interactions but shifting gaze in group settings is largely
understudied in the literature. Misinterpreting or not noticing shifting gaze can result in
missed opportunities for shared social information. Humans will look where others are
looking which aids in following a conversation between multiple people and in gathering
information that the speaker is trying to convey (Driver IV et al., 1999). Although gaze
is usually considered to be a prosocial action, it may also be interpreted negatively.
Threatening or competitive gaze, for instance (Jellison & Ickes, 1974), is negatively
interpreted, and results in autonomic arousal for most people and avoidance of gaze for
the particularly anxious.
3

Once eye contact is properly noticed and interpreted, additional social processes
begin. Making eye contact allows for faster access to stored, categorical social
information, such as gender and race (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Macrae et al.
(2002) assessed the interaction of gaze and access to categorical social information. They
found that participants were significantly faster at categorizing targets in photographs as
male or female when the targets were looking straight ahead with open eyes, similar to
“direct gaze.” Furthermore, Macrae et al. used similar images flashed briefly before
stereotypically male or female words and showed that these words were sorted
significantly faster when the flashed target was looking straight ahead. Proper detection
of direct gaze can provide one with more social information with which to enter a social
interaction.
Accessing stored knowledge has obvious advantages but the ability to respond
to another in real time, such as reading another’s emotional state, is also necessary for
successful socializing. Shorter times to access this information can ease an interaction,
as past interactions or social information will inform a current interaction, highlighting
the importance of efficient gaze detection. Obviously, in the automatic processes of
gaze detection, there are a number of social skills, physiological abilities, and cognitive
processes at play. To facilitate these nonverbal behaviors, gaze must first be noticed –
which is why the stare-in-the-crowd effect is particularly important. The goal of this
study was to develop a model that describes the stare-in-the-crowd effect more fully to
better understand the critical beginnings of social interactions.
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1.1.3 Gaze for Emotion Identification
In addition to the social information provided by gaze, gaze detection also enables
rapid identification of emotions displayed by others. Viewing the eye region results in
significantly better identification of basic emotions (such as anger and happiness) than
viewing the mouth region. Direct gaze also results in quicker identification of basic
emotions. For non-basic emotions (such as “flirtatious” or “thoughtful”), displaying the
eye region or whole face results in the same accuracy of emotion identification (BaronCohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997). Moreover, for non-basic emotions, gaze
direction also does not significantly impact the speed of identification (Adams & Kleck,
2003).
One possible explanation for these findings is encompassed in how humans
display emotion. To modulate social responses, humans exert cognitive control over the
lower half of their faces. For instance, a social thinker may be cognizant that facially
showing frustration may not be appropriate in a particular work setting. Thus, even if
they are feeling frustrated, they will consciously display a more appropriate emotion in
the lower half of their face. They cannot, however, exert the same control over their eyes.
Frustration, therefore, would still be detectable through the eye region. Not only would
the emotion in the eyes provide information to the observer, but so would the mismatch
between emotions detected through the eyes and the lower half of the face. Part of why
looking at the eyes of another is so informative is that the eyes transmit information about
emotions that cannot be controlled (E. D. Ross, Shayya, Champlain, Monnot, & Prodan,
5

2013; R. G. Ross, Harris, Olincy, & Radant, 2000). Thus, the eyes provide an unfiltered
emotional response. More basic emotions, such as anger or happiness, may be easier to
read from just the eyes. Non-basic emotions may require more intentional demonstrations
and thus direct gaze (or reading emotions from the eyes only) simply does not provide
enough information.

1.2 Current State of the Field
1.2.1 Eye Tracking
Eye tracking has been the main tool used to study the stare-in-the-crowd effect.
Without invasive procedures or lengthy setup times, eye tracking allows for this
phenomenon to be studied simply by capturing how viewers take in visual stimuli.
Hundreds of variables are collected, including interest area dwell time (how much time a
viewer spends looking in a pre-determined area across a trial), time to first fixation (how
long it takes a viewer to first stop on a feature of the image), and fixation duration (how
long the eye stops on a feature). The outcomes from the eye tracker reflect a viewer’s
experience of that visual stimulus. For instance, fixating on a particular area of an image
conveys emotional saliency on the part of the viewer (Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley,
2004). The time humans spend looking at objects indicates how informative that visual
stimulus is (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967). Thus, by
presenting an image or video and calculating where, when, and for how long fixations
occur, researchers can draw conclusions about what aspects of an image are providing the
viewer with the most information. The number of times a subject returns to an area (i.e.,
6

the number of saccades into a region) as well as how much time is spent looking there
(i.e. the fixation duration) is generally interpreted as an area that a subject finds
interesting, surprising, or informative.
For the purpose of studying complex social situations, social scenes can be
presented and the most salient parts of a scene can be identified based on eye tracking
outcomes (e.g., Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). This allows one to ask
questions about how humans derive social information, and to examine comparisons
between groups with different types of psychopathology. Because eye movement
research is not reliant on self-report, there is a high potential for its use in research with
populations unable to engage verbally, such as infants or those diagnosed with severe
psychopathology, communication disorder, or autism spectrum disorders. Farroni and
colleagues (2002) demonstrated with an eye tracking paradigm that infants show a
preference for their mother’s face over a stranger’s within weeks of birth. For studying
reactions to quickly presented stimuli, eye tracking captures immediate gaze responses as
the social information process begins.
1.2.2 Stimulus Design
Despite all of the functions gaze detection fills and the relative ease of eye
tracking paradigms to test them, the study of the stare-in-the-crowd effect has been
relatively limited. To study this phenomenon, the stimuli to be used must be mindfully
designed. Many studies of gaze detection use sketches on eyes (von Grunau & Anston,
1995) or images of eyes only (without the rest of the face) (Senju, Kikuchi, Hasegawa,
Tojo, & Osanai, 2008). These studies are useful in isolating reactions to eye movements
7

but have less utility in understanding the stare-in-the-crowd effect. Other studies, using
video or photographs, more closely approximate “real life” settings; however, when gaze
shifts, the orientation of a target’s head and neck also shifts (Bockler, Timmermans,
Sebanz, Vogeley, & Schilbach, 2014b; Klin et al., 2002), thus providing more clues to the
viewer about gaze other than just the eyes. Multi-sitter images in which eye movements
are the only change between images should be used to begin to explore the stare-in-thecrowd effect in more depth, specifically in relation to situations such as “getting caught
staring” or “catching another staring.”
1.3 Pilot
To improve upon the current methodology, we developed a new paradigm to
capture the stare-in-the-crowd effect. In this paradigm, we utilized images with groups of
people (Figure 1) and two new dynamic social gaze conditions (getting caught staring
and catching another staring). The stimuli were created for the purpose of the pilot study
and the paradigm was tested in a pilot study of typically developing adults. To create the
stimuli, and after informed consent to use their likenesses was obtained, we took
photographs of groups of adults. With head and body oriented in the same way, two
photographs were taken; one with all eyes directed at the camera (at the viewer) and one
with all eyes directed elsewhere (Figure 2). Adobe Photoshop was then used to create two
sets of stimuli; for the first, the photograph in which all eyes are directed elsewhere was
utilized. For the second, one set of eyes was edited by overlaying the other half of the
photograph pair so that a single pair of target eyes was directed at the viewer and all
others were averted.
8

Figure 1. An example of the visual stimuli developed for this study. In each image, either one stimulus face
is self-directed or none are self-directed, i.e. averted.

These stimuli differ from other research endeavors in three primary ways. First,
each image uses a group of sitters, thus mimicking gaze detection amongst multiple
faces. Second, the heads and necks of the targets never shift, only their eyes. Third, the
use of trigger boundaries (once the viewer’s eyes cross this boundary, a new image is
displayed) allows for shifting images from averted gaze to self-directed gaze, ideally
recreating the experiences of “getting caught staring” (in which a face initially displaying
averted gaze shifts to “look” at the viewer once the viewer fixates on that face) or
“catching another staring” (in which a target face shifts from viewer-directed gaze to
averted gaze once the viewer fixates on their face) (Figure 2). To our knowledge, there
are few studies looking at these common experiences and none that incorporate stimuli
which “react” to the behavior of the viewer.

9

Figure 2. The left face illustrates “mutual” gaze. The right face illustrates “averted” gaze. The ovals are
boundaries used to trigger a change in the gaze and for analytic purposes.

In the pilot study of 35 typically-developing adults, self-directed gaze resulted in
longer looking times (longer dwell times as well as more fixations). Second fixation
duration was significantly higher in conditions in which there was shifting gaze (e.g. the
initial glance had triggered a new image) except if the stable gaze was direct, in which
case self-directed gaze resulted in longer second fixation durations, even in comparison
to shifting images. These stimuli successfully demonstrated the stare-in-the-crowd effect.
Additionally, by using shifting images, the experiences of “getting caught staring” and
“catching another staring” were recreated to allow for further development of a social
perceptual model.
Two significant correlations with the behavioral measures were found in the pilot
study, and one trend-level association was observed. The Expressive subscale of the
Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) was positively correlated with pupil size (r = .53,
p<.05). In addition, analysis of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, on which participants
rate a list of situations based on both their fear of this situation and their avoidance of this
situation, demonstrated that fear of “Looking at people you don’t know very well in the
eyes” was negatively correlated with fixation count at the trend level (r = -.45, p = .05).
Avoidance of looking at people in the eyes was also significantly negatively correlated
10

with fixation count (r = -.49, p < .05). Given that participants without any
psychopathology were specifically recruited, the limited range of these measures likely
limited other significant correlations. Despite this restriction in the range of impairment
in this typically-developing sample, the presence of significant findings related to social
behavior was the impetus for the current proposal – to study the stare-in-the-crowd effect
in a clinical population.

1.4 Current Study
Given the success of experimentally simulating the stare-in-the-crowd effect and
building on the foundation developed in the course of the pilot study, this study examined
two domains thought to be pertinent in understanding the stare-in-the-crowd effect:
psychopathology and autonomic arousal.
1.4.1 Psychopathology
For the purposes of this study, characteristics relating to autism (including theory
of mind and social responsiveness) and social anxiety traits were examined. Given the
social impairments relating to each, it is not surprising that autism and social anxiety are
two diagnoses that have been previously studied using eye tracking. Although ASD and
TD individuals comprised most of the group comparisons in this study, traits of social
anxiety were factored into the dimensional analysis of gaze detection and arousal and
thus these traits are discussed here as well.
1.4.2 Autism Spectrum Disorder
Pelphrey and colleagues' (2002) widely-recognized study focused on visual
scanning of faces in adults with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). They found that
11

typically-developing (TD) individuals scan faces with primary focus on the “T-zone”
(includes the eyes and the mouth) when presented with a face whereas the adults with
ASD spent less time looking at the eyes and less time looking in this T-zone. Because
this region conveys emotions, intentionality and social referencing, all of these data are
then missed by individuals with ASD. Not surprisingly, more complex social perceptual
abilities appear to be different in individuals with ASD as well. Children with autism
were less able to recognize repeated facial stimuli when compared to matched controls,
even though their ability to recognize inanimate, non-social objects may have been
superior to controls (Trepagnier, Sebrechts, & Peterson, 2002). Von Hofsten, Uhlig,
Adell, and Kochukhova (2009) found that children with ASD were able to follow the
movements of a rolling ball with the same smooth pursuit as typical controls but that they
were significantly less likely to visually anticipate shifts in speakers during a
conversation. There is something unique about the social aspect of faces that is less
readable for individuals with ASD. In general, individuals with autism make less eye
contact than their typically-developing counterparts (Werner, Dawson, Osterling, &
Dinno, 2000) and struggle to follow gaze in a multiple-participant interaction (Dawson et
al., 2004). Even eye contact after a strong emotionally-valenced social interaction, such
as tickling, results in less eye contact from children with ASD than typically developing
children or children with intellectual impairments (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman,
1986). These deficits suggest that the stare-in-the-crowd effect in particular would be less
strong in individuals with social responsiveness impairments.
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These differences in gaze behavior are indicative of neural activation differences
relative to ASD status on gaze detection paradigms as well. Visual change detection in
adults with ASD is known to be atypical relative to typically-developing controls. There
is abnormal activation in the anterior cingulate cortex when presented with a changing
visual stimulus in individuals with ASD that is not observed in TD adults (Clery et al.,
2013). Different neurological responses relative to diagnostic status are also observed in
response to social material, indicating again that there is something unique about social
stimuli for individuals with ASD. Adults with ASD do not exhibit differences in reflexive
gaze following but there are different neural mechanisms underlying the process (Greene
et al., 2011). During a gaze detection paradigm, increased negativity, when it is observed,
is lateralized to the right hemisphere in typically-developing children but this
lateralization was not observed in children with ASD (Senju, Tojo, Yaguchi, &
Hasegawa, 2005). Thus, the neurological activity occurring during social perceptual tasks
differs relative to ASD status. Although neural activation was not studied in this current
project, it is important to be aware of these activation differences to possibly explain
some of the gaze behavior differences we predicted.
1.4.3 Theory of Mind
One’s level of theory of mind has been shown to be associated with gaze
detection ability. Theory of mind describes one’s ability to attribute mental states to
oneself and others and has been identified in both humans and chimpanzees (BaronCohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Theory of mind is related to
gaze behavior: eye contact is the main source of information about the mental states and
13

intentions of others (Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1992). In fact, the theory of mind
neural network (which activates when engaged in tasks determining mental states of
others) significantly overlaps with the networks activated by direct gaze. Much of the
work on theory of mind has been conducted with individuals with ASD as limited theory
of mind is one of the challenges of autism. Children with and without mental handicaps
(and without ASD) can infer mental states based on eye gaze whereas children with ASD
cannot (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995). Since a less
developed theory of mind is present in individuals with ASD, it is hypothesized that these
eye gaze deficits are related to theory of mind abilities.
The detection and conveying of emotions requires not only emotional knowledge
but theory of mind as well. Looking at self-directed gaze indicates interest in that gaze.
Von dem Hagen et al. (2013) hypothesized that TD individuals (assumed to have
developed theory of mind) recognize the agency of someone looking at them. Based on
this knowledge, they may initiate a conversation or respond to this gaze in some way.
Imaging studies have shown that, in these situations, individuals with ASD display less
activation in areas associated with theory of mind than TD individuals (von dem Hagen,
Stoyanova, Rowe, Baron-Cohen, & Calder, 2013). Since theory of mind is generally
impaired in individuals with ASD, this suggests that the ability to attribute thoughts or
feelings to others also impacts how individuals detect and react to self-directed gaze. This
study examines the relation between theory of mind and the stare-in the-crowd effect
more closely.
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A better understanding of theory of mind and gaze detection would be beneficial
for two reasons. The first is that gaze detection develops very early on, before theory of
mind can be assessed, and a well-vetted gaze detection task could serve as an early
screener for theory of mind deficits. The second is that, by understanding how they are
related, interventions that target either gaze behavior or theory of mind concepts can be
developed to improve functioning in this area. But before either of these goals can be
achieved, the relation between theory of mind and gaze behavior must be more clearly
defined.
1.4.4 Social Responsiveness
Social responsiveness, another domain traditionally impaired in individuals with
ASD, has also been explored in gaze research. Specific correlates of gaze detection and
traits related to autism vary by study. Many studies rely solely on categorical diagnostic
status (Nakano et al., 2010; Neumann, Spezio, Piven, & Adolphs, 2006; Phillips et al.,
1992). However, given the variability possible within an ASD diagnosis, there is more to
learn about specific behavioral correlates of gaze detection. In this proposal, social
responsiveness will be assessed dimensionally to further characterize the relation between
ASD and gaze detection.
Social responsiveness encompasses the ability to be aware of, to interpret, and to
respond to the social behaviors of others in an appropriate way (Constantino et al., 2003).
Picking out and reacting to gaze necessarily hinges on the knowledge that another person
is using gaze to communicate. Thus, as with theory of mind, one’s social responsiveness
is likely related to the ability to detect self-directed gaze. Disorders in which social ability
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is impaired, such as ASD, Turner syndrome, or Williams syndrome, have repeatedly been
shown to be associated with deficits in perception of eye movements of others (Elgar,
Campbell, & Skuse, 2002; Mobbs et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 1992). Specific domains of
social responsiveness have yet to be fully explored in the literature. Social responsiveness
is known to be impaired in ASD (Schreibman, 1988) and thus was included in the
dimensional analyses here.
1.4.5 Social Anxiety
Although not specific to ASD, social anxiety has been shown to influence gaze
behavior [for a brief review, see Schulze, Renneberg, & Lobmaier, 2013]. Individuals
with social anxiety tend to be overly watchful for self-directed gaze (Gamer, Hecht,
Seipp, & Hiller, 2011). Once noticed, however, the avoidance of eye contact in social
anxiety has been well-documented and may be a maintaining factor of the disorder
(Baker & Edelmann, 2002). Individuals with social anxiety disorder have been shown to
make less eye contact during social conversations and to make less gaze fixations on eyes
during eye tracking studies. Given the amount of social information conveyed via eye
contact, it is likely that this missed information may only be supporting maladaptive
thinking patterns commonly observed in individuals with social anxiety. Using a
behavioral questionnaire about eye contact, self-reported eye contact was found to be
significantly negatively correlated with social anxiety (Daly, 1978). Social anxiety traits
were, therefore, measured as part of this study to begin to understand how these may
affect gaze detection, both on their own and in the context of theory of mind and social
responsiveness.
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1.4.6 Autonomic Arousal
Identification of neurological correlates of these social and non-social processes
would provide additional insight into the effects of ASD on social perception and gaze. In
a study by Loth, Carolos, Gomez, and Happe (2008) comparing detection of sceneunrelated objects, scene-related objects, or object substitutions, TD adults could identify
differences in images depending on the condition. However, for the adults with ASD,
there was no effect of condition on ability to detect change and, in comparison to the TD
group, these individuals were significantly less successful at identifying scene-unrelated
objects. This suggests that adults with ASD develop less schematic expectations. For the
current study, we expected that this may translate into differences between adults with
ASD and TD adults in their reactions to shifting gaze in an image. We expected that the
TD adults would experience autonomic arousal whereas the adults with ASD would look
at changes in the images in the same manner but respond differently, as they would not
interpret this shift as anything beyond a stimulus change.
The autonomic nervous system (ANS) refers to the “fight or flight” and “rest and
relax” systems that are unconsciously activated in new situations. The ANS has two
components: the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems. Because these mechanisms
are activated automatically rather than intentionally, they make for strong markers of
internal activity. In this proposal, pupil dilation and heart rate were measured, since both
are under sympathetic and parasympathetic control and provide a convenient window
into the ANS.
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Previous research has suggested that pupil dilation indicates surprise or an
increase in cognitive effort (Preuschoff, Hart, & Einhauser, 2011). This increase,
however, was less apparent in unmedicated depressed adults in comparison to healthy
controls, indicating that psychopathology moderates the relation between cognitive effort
and pupil dilation (Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004).
In addition to measuring pupil dilation to capture autonomic reactions to visual
stimuli, heart rate variability was measured as a complementary measure of ANS
function. The study of gaze and heart rate has been a particular focus in infant research.
Sroufe and Waters (1977) studied gaze aversion and autonomic arousal in infants and
found that gaze aversion followed heart rate acceleration followed by a return to base
levels. Generally, unmet gaze was not related to autonomic arousal (i.e. avoidance of
gaze appears to be an effective avoidance strategy to circumvent increased heart rate) but
the feeling of increased heart rate often resulted in gaze aversion. Sroufe and Waters
suggest that gaze aversion appeared to be a coping mechanism in the infant population.
Studies of heart rate variability in stressful situations have shown increased heart
rate, with girls and young people showing significantly more increase than boys and
elderly adults, respectively (Kudielka, Buske-Kirschbaum, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum,
2004). In a study of rhesus macaques, heart rate during social interactions was measured
(Aureli, Preston, & de Waal, 1999). In the more stressful situations, such as approach by
a dominant group member, heart rate increased. Conversely, grooming behaviors by
group members caused significantly more decrease in heart rate in comparison to a
control time; thus, the interpretation of a social situation can be informed by using heart
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rate variability. The study of real-world social situations, however, demands adaptive
social functioning. In disorders such as ASD, this may not be a given, and calls for an
alternative experimental approach.
Broadly, children with ASD have been observed to have faster heart rates than
typically developing children (Bal et al., 2010). There is overlap between symptoms of
autism and dysfunction of the ANS (Ming, Julu, Brimacombe, Connor, & Daniels, 2005)
and the continued study of ANS functioning in specific social situations is important to
develop a model of autonomic arousal and social processing in ASD. Generally speaking,
cardiovascular changes are not observed in response to sensory intake in children with
ASD (Kootz & Cohen, 1981). The effect of social perception on heart rate is also a topic
of interest relative to social anxiety. The perception of direct gaze is related to increased
heart rate in highly socially anxious adults, with a significantly greater increase than
those without social anxiety (Wieser, Pauli, Alpers, & Muhlberger, 2009). In the study of
shifting gaze, as studied here, comprehensive measures of psychopathology phenotypes
and heart rate were examined to allow for maximal modeling of how social perceptual
systems function (or are impaired) in clinical populations.

1.5 Specific Aims
Given what knowledge we have already acquired and the pursuit of more careful
characterization of the stare-in-the-crowed phenomenon, this proposal incorporated eye
tracking and autonomic arousal while taking into account social responsiveness, theory of
mind, and social anxiety. A group of adults with ASD were recruited, as social
responsiveness and theory of mind are lower in this population. Additionally, pupil
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diameter and heart rate data were collected during the presentation of the stimuli. For
these analyses, the term arousal is used to refer to IA pupil size and RMSSD. This study
had three specific aims and related hypotheses:
Specific Aim 1: To determine how stimulus condition affects eye tracking and arousal
outcomes.
Hypothesis 1a: Interest area dwell time and interest area fixation count will be greater in
conditions with more direct gaze (mutual and getting caught staring) than less direct gaze
(averted and catching another staring).
Hypothesis 1b: Second fixation duration will be greater for dynamic conditions (getting
caught staring and catching another staring) than stable conditions (mutual and averted).
Hypothesis 1c: Arousal will be greater in dynamic conditions (getting caught staring and
catching another staring) than stable conditions (mutual and averted).
Specific Aim 2: To determine the relation of diagnosis and diagnosis by condition with
tracking and arousal outcomes.
Hypothesis 2a: Across conditions, eye tracking measures and arousal will be greater in
the TD group than in the ASD group.
Hypothesis 2b: For two of the eye tracking measures (IA dwell time, IA fixation count),
there will be an interaction between diagnosis and condition, with the eye tracking
measures being greater in the TD group than in the ASD group in the more direct gaze
conditions (mutual and getting caught staring).
Hypothesis 2c: For second fixation duration and arousal, there will be an interaction
between diagnosis and condition, with second fixation duration and arousal being greater
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in the TD group than in the ASD group in the dynamic conditions (getting caught staring
and catching another staring).
Specific Aim 3: To establish how specific dimensionally-measured traits relate to eye
tracking and arousal outcomes, regardless of diagnosis.
Hypothesis 3a: Higher scores on the Social Responsiveness Scale (indicating more
problems with social responsiveness) will be negatively associated with eye tracking
measures and arousal.
Hypothesis 3b: Higher scores on the Theory of Mind Inventory (indicating greater theory
of mind) will be positively associated with eye tracking measures and arousal.
Hypothesis 3c: Higher scores on Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (indicating more social
anxiety) will be negatively associated with eye tracking measures but positively
associated with arousal.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS
2.1 Subjects
Two main groups were recruited: a group with ASD and a TD group. For the
group with ASD, individuals were required to have a diagnosis of ASD or Pervasive
Developmental Disorder (PDD) that was documented by a medical professional. For the
TD group, inclusion criteria also included no known diagnosis of ASD or PDD and no
current psychotropic medications. Subjects were recruited through four primary channels:
(1) undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology courses; (2)
individuals with ASD recruited through a supportive living environment at UVM; (3)
individuals with ASD recruited through child psychiatry at UVM; and (4) community
means, including flyers and newspaper advertisements. A total of 36 participants ages 1835 were recruited.
2.2 Study Visit
Eligible participants were consented and the setup for the eye tracking and VUAMS system (for heart rate monitoring) was explained as they were connected to these
systems. Study staff first attached the VU-AMS electrodes to the participant. The
participant was then seated in front of the eye tracker and the adjustable head rest was set
up. The visual stimuli were presented on a screen 18 inches from the participant and they
were instructed to look at the images. At the end of the stimuli presentation, the VUAMS electrodes were removed. The cognitive assessment was then administered,
followed by completion of the behavioral measures and a demographics form, which
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included questions about current medications, any vision troubles, and documentation of
their current psychology course if they were seeking course credit.

2.3 Visual Stimuli
To assess the stare-in-the-crowd effect, a previously validated visual stimuli set
was presented. These stimuli fall into four conditions; mutual gaze, averted gaze, getting
caught staring, and catching another staring. These conditions are described below and
illustrated in Figure 3. For the purposes of clarity, the term “sitter” will be used to
describe the people in these photos and the term “target” will be used to describe the
sitter who is of interest in that particular image.
Averted and mutual gaze
(stable conditions)
Averted

Mutual

Catching another and getting
caught staring (dynamic
conditions)
Catching another staring Getting caught staring
Figure 3. Example of gaze condition comparisons. For the “dynamic” conditions, fixation on the eyes of
the first picture triggers the change in gaze of the second image. In the “stable” conditions, fixation on the
face does not result in shifting gaze.

Each condition is simulated using two images. A trigger boundary is drawn
around the face of one of the sitters. Once the participant’s gaze crosses this boundary,
the second image is cued up. If the first and second image were the same, this is
considered a “stable” condition (i.e., no change in gaze). If the first and second image
were different such that the gaze of the target shifted in some way, this is considered a
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“dynamic” condition. For instance, if the participant looks in the trigger boundary area of
a target with averted gaze, this will cue up a new image in which the eyes of the target are
now participant- (“self-“) directed. Each condition is described below (also see Figure 3).
1) For the averted gaze condition, all sitters will display averted gaze in both identical
images.
2) For the mutual gaze condition, two identical images with one target directing gaze at
the participant and all other sitters looking away.
3) In the catching another staring condition, the first image will have one participantdirected target and ‘eye contact’ with this individual will cue up a photo with all averted
gaze sitters.
4) In the getting caught staring condition, the initial image will consist of all averted gaze
sitters and ‘eye contact’ with one sitter will cue up the second image with one participantdirected target.
To facilitate detection of changes in physiological responses to the conditions,
participants viewed five blocks of images, one for each condition and one that was a
combination of the two dynamic conditions. Each block consisted of 20 visual stimuli.
The order of the images were counter-balanced across blocks and subjects, although the
first and third block only included the mutual or averted gaze experiences to serve as a
baseline.
2.4 Behavioral Measures
The Social Responsiveness Scale- Adult Self-Report (SRS) (Constantino &
Gruber, 2005) is a 65-item measure of the frequency of social response. The SRS has a
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Cronbach’s alpha of .71 in typically developing populations (Bolte, 2012). Respondents
rate each item on a 1 (Not True) to 4 (Almost Always True) scale. A total and five
subscale (Receptive, Social, Expressive Language, Cognitive, Preoccupations) scores are
calculated. The presence of ASD is suggested by a high total score on this measure.
Although the SRS-A is not a diagnostic tool, it has utility in identifying adults with
profiles similar to those who have ASD. Only the total score was used in the current
project.
The Theory of Mind Inventory (ToMI) (Hutchins, Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2012) is
a 48-item inventory that measures the ability to take another’s perspective. Use of this
measure allowed for parsing out theory of mind effects over and above social
responsiveness across the TD and ASD adults. The parent-report ToMI has a Cronbach's
alpha of .98. Typically completed by parents, the ToMI was rephrased into “I”
statements for participants to complete about themselves. A total score was calculated, as
well as subscales measuring early, basic, and advanced level of theory of mind.
The Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) (Heimberg et al., 1999) is a highly
reliable (α = .96) 24-item measure of social anxiety. The respondent rates each item on a
scale from 0-3 for fear or Anxiety and from 0-3 for Avoidance. Item #19 (“Looking at
people you don’t know very well in the eyes”) was isolated for use in analyses described
below due to its relevance to the paradigm.

2.5 Cognitive Assessment
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was
used to obtain an estimate of the cognitive ability of each participant. The WASI was
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designed as a brief cognitive screener for individuals ages 6-89. Summary IQ scores have
a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. For this study, two subscales were
administered (Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) and combined for the estimated Full
Scale IQ- Two Subtest. This overall score was used in subsequent analyses.

2.6 Psychophysiological Measures
2.6.1 Eye Tracking
The EyeLink1000 collects over 100 measures of gaze behavior, the term used
here to refer to eye movements such as fixation location, fixation duration, saccades,
blinks, etc. The sensitivity of the camera allows for detection of eye movements as small
as 0.5 degrees of visual angle. Sitting 18 inches from a computer monitor, this translates
into 0.2 inches on the monitor. Given the images used here, this allows for differentiation
between a glance at the left versus right eye. Preset areas of interest allow for
comparisons of time spent looking at different regions of an image, for instance the eyes
vs. non-eye facial regions. The quantitative monitoring of these fixation locations,
fixation durations, and looking patterns conveys inner processes of the viewer.
2.6.2 VU-AMS
The VU-AMS measures heart rate variability (HRV) and respiratory rate. This
small box is worn on the belt and there is a 6-electrode system that records ECG and
thoracic activity. The skin is cleaned with alcohol and then the ECG disposable
electrodes are attached to the chest. Participants are asked to sit still, to decrease the
effects of movement on HRV. Physiological outcomes were calculated by comparing
each participant’s baseline rate to relevant points during the stimuli presentation.
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2.7 Preparation of Variables
2.7.1 Eye Tracking Variables
Four main outcome variables were used for analysis, based on the results of the
pilot study: Interest Area Dwell Time, Interest Area Fixation Count, Second Fixation
Duration, and Interest Area Pupil Size. Averages were calculated and analysis of variance
(ANOVA) procedures were used to test for significant differences by diagnosis and
condition. Moving forward, “interest area” will be denoted by the abbreviation “IA.”
2.7.2 VU-AMS
Although multiple measures of heart rate variability (HRV) can be calculated
from the VU-AMS data, we operationalized HRV using the root mean square of
successive differences (RMSSD) for each of the conditions for participants. ANOVA
procedures were used to determine if RMSSD was significantly different by diagnosis
and condition.
2.8 Data Analyses
Aims and hypotheses are restated below, followed by the data analytic approach
for each to promote clarity. Additionally, the hypothesized findings are presented in the
Appendix.
2.8.1 Specific Aim 1 and Hypotheses
Specific Aim 1: To determine how stimulus condition affects eye tracking and
arousal outcomes.
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Hypothesis 1a: IA dwell time and IA fixation count will be greater in conditions
with more self-directed gaze (mutual and getting caught staring) than less (averted and
catching another staring).
Hypothesis 1b: IA second fixation duration will be greater for dynamic conditions
(catching another staring and getting caught staring) than stable conditions (averted and
mutual).
Hypothesis 1c: Arousal will be greater in dynamic conditions (catching another
staring and getting caught staring) than stable conditions (averted and mutual).
2.8.2 Specific Aim 2 and Hypotheses
Specific Aim 2: To determine the relation of diagnosis and diagnosis by condition
with tracking and arousal outcomes.
Hypothesis 2a: Across conditions, eye tracking measures and arousal will be
greater in the TD group than in the ASD group.
Hypothesis 2b: For two of the eye tracking measures (IA dwell time, IA fixation
count), there will be an interaction between diagnosis and condition, with the eye
tracking measures being greater in the TD group than in the ASD group in the selfdirected conditions (mutual and getting caught staring).
Hypothesis 2c: For second fixation duration and arousal, there will be an
interaction between diagnosis and condition, with second fixation duration and arousal
being greater in the TD group than in the ASD group in the dynamic conditions (getting
caught staring and catching another staring).
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For specific aims 1 and 2, repeated measure ANOVAs (with condition as the
repeated measure and diagnosis as the independent variable) were conducted with the
following measures as dependent variables: IA dwell time, IA fixation count, IA second
fixation duration, IA pupil size, and RMSSD. Main effects of diagnosis and condition
were considered for Hypotheses 1a-c and 2a and the interaction term was considered for
Hypothesis 2b and c.

2.8.3 Specific Aim 3 and Hypotheses
Specific Aim 3: To establish how specific dimensionally-measured traits relate to
eye tracking and arousal outcomes, regardless of diagnosis.
Hypothesis 3a: Higher scores on the Social Responsiveness Scale (indicating
more problems with social responsiveness) will be negatively associated with eye
tracking measures and arousal.
Hypothesis 3b: Higher scores on the Theory of Mind Inventory (indicating greater
theory of mind) will be positively associated with eye tracking measures and arousal.
Hypothesis 3c: Higher scores on Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (indicating more
social anxiety) will be negatively associated with eye tracking measures but positively
associated with arousal.
For specific aim 3, hierarchical regressions were conducted with the Social
Responsiveness Scale (total score), Theory of Mind Inventory (total score and subscales),
and Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Item #19) as independent variables, eye tracking
measures and arousal as dependent variables, and age, sex, and IQ as fixed effects. To
capture the variation in response to the different conditions, difference scores were
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calculated. Difference scores for IA dwell time, IA fixation count, IA s0econd fixation
duration, IA pupil size, and RMSSD were calculated relative to stable and dynamic
conditions (e.g. How many more IA fixations did a person make in the catching another
staring and getting caught staring conditions versus the averted and mutual conditions?)
and relative to amount of self-directed gaze conditions (e.g. What was the difference in
RMSSD between the averted and catching another staring conditions versus mutual and
getting caught staring conditions?). Pearson correlations between the behavioral
questionnaire scales and the eye tracking and arousal difference scores were calculated
(Table 2) and significant correlations were then modeled.

2.9 Power
Using G-Power, we calculated that with a sample of 36, we would have the
power to detect an effect size of .19, using alpha = 0.05 and 1-beta = 0.8 for the ANOVA.
For the regression analyses, we calculated that we will have the power to detect an effect
size of .29, using alpha = 0.05 and 1-beta = 0.8.
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS
3.1 Preliminary Analyses
3.1.1 Demographics
The overall sample included 36 adults (MAge = 20.53 years, SD = 2.22; 41.7%
female). Of these, 15 were diagnosed with ASD or PDD and 21 were not. There were no
significant differences between the two groups by age, sex, or IQ. Complete data were
available for the Social Responsiveness Scale (α = .92), Theory of Mind Inventory (α =
.92), and Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (α = .94). Total scores on each of these
measures differed significantly by group membership (Table 1). Correlations between
behavioral measures and difference scores are listed in Table 2.
Initially, participants were matched between the ASD and TD groups.
Exploratory comparisons were made to determine if including data from all available TD
individuals significantly changed the outcome of the analyses; it did not. Thus, these
additional TD individuals were included in the analyses to provide additional power.
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Table 1. Descriptives

Typically-developing
M

ASD

SD
21.20

SD

Age

20.05

Sex

48% female

IQ

109.71

14.05

117.00

11.73

Theory of Mind InventoryTotal*

19.09

,76

17.63

2.07

ToMI Early

18.15

1.50

16.74

2.80

ToMI Basic

19.22

.78

18.57

2.41

ToMI Advanced****

19.353

.69

16.89

2.36

35.90

12.24

78.13

35.57

SRS Awareness*

6.67

1.39

8.67

3.31

SRS Cognition****

4.76

2.53

12.07

7.19

SRS Communication**** 11.29

5.44

25.73

12.76

SRS Motivation****

8.62

4.34

16.13

6.88

SRS Autistic
Mannerisms****

4.57

2.77

15.53

8.45

LSAS Total*

36.05

15.29

53.20

26.01

LSAS Fear/Anxiety*

18.48

6.88

27.80

12.68

LSAS Avoidance

17.57

9.19

25.40

15.39

LSAS #19 Fear*

1.33

.48

1.87

.92

LSAS #19 Avoidance*

1.14

.36

1.93

1.28

Social Responsiveness
Scale total****

1.16

M

3.10

33% female

*Indicates significant difference between diagnostic groups at p < .05 level, ** p < .01,
*** p <.005, and **** p <.001
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Table 2. Correlations between behavioral measures and difference scores.
Theory of Mind Inventory
Early
IA Dwell
Time

IA Fixation
Count

IA Second
Fixation
Duration

IA Pupil
Size

RMSSD

Basic Advanced

SRS

LSAS#19

Total

Total

Fear/Anx Avoid

Stable
vs.
Dynamic

-.04

.03

.28

.14

-.06

.06

-.22

More EC
vs. Less

.37*

.25

.65**

.51**

-.46**

-.24

-.25

Stable
vs.
Dynamic

-.13

.06

.17

.08

.16

.17

-.16

More EC
vs. Less

.36*

.30

.62**

.52**

-.33*

-.31

-.23

Stable
vs.
Dynamic

.06

.03

.14

.09

-.04

.13

.13

More EC
vs. Less

.25

.01

.38*

.24

-.48**

-.23

-.30

Stable
vs.
Dynamic

-.19

-.14

-.08

-.15

.17

.07

.13

More EC
vs. Less

-.14

-.17

-.34*

-.27

.06

.14

.12

Stable
vs.
Dynamic

-.20

.01

-.15

-.12

.22

.09

.04

More EC
vs. Less

-.15

-.13

-.30

-.24

.06

.15

.07

*indicates p < .05, ** p < .01

3.1.2 Missing Data
For the eye tracking variables, cognitive assessment, and behavioral
questionnaires, there were no missing data. Heart rate data were missing for eight
participants, six in the control group (28%) and two in the ASD group (13%). Missing
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data occurred as a result of system error with the VU-AMS for seven of the participants;
one participant from the ASD group could not tolerate the electrodes and thus no heart
rate data was collected during their study visit. Comparisons were made between the
groups with and without missing heart rate data and there were no significant differences
of diagnosis, age, sex, IQ, SRS total score, ToMI total score, or LSAS item #19 score.
3.1.3 Addressing Normality Violations
Prior to conducting the ANOVAs, variables of interest were examined for
possible assumption violation. Positive skewness was a significant concern for two of the
variables of interest, IA second fixation duration and IA pupil size. A logarithmic
transformation was applied and this brought these variables within acceptable normality
limits. For pairwise comparisons, Bonferroni corrections were used to adjust for multiple
comparisons.
Assumptions of hierarchical multiple regression were tested prior to analysis. For
the dependent variables, transformations described in the analyses above were again
applied to IA second fixation duration and IA pupil size, thus correcting for normality.
The Durbin-Watson statistic fell within the acceptable range for each model, indicating
no issues with auto collinearity. All dependent variables were free of extreme outliers and
inspection of scatter plots indicated the assumption of homoscedasticity was met. Many
of the independent variables were not normally distributed; negative skew was significant
for most of the behavior questionnaires. Attempts to transform these variables (using
reciprocal, square root, and logarithmic transformations) did not significantly improve the
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normality. Thus, the un-transformed behavioral questionnaire scores (independent
variables) were used in analyses and thus results should be interpreted with this in mind.

3.2 Analyses
Specific Aims 1 & 2: To determine how stimulus condition affects eye tracking and
arousal outcomes and to determine the relation of diagnosis and diagnosis by condition
with tracking and arousal outcomes.
3.2.1 IA Dwell Time
Due to violation of sphericity, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for IA
dwell time analyses. There was a significant main effect of diagnosis, F(1, 34) = 17.00, p
< .001, with TD individuals exhibiting significantly more IA dwell time (M = 778.78, SD
= 307.35) than the individuals with ASD (M = 399.12, SD = 213.69), as hypothesized.
There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(1.85, 62.89) = 44.38, p < .001,
with the getting caught staring condition eliciting the longest dwell time (M = 991.78, SD
= 621.54), followed by the mutual condition (M = 791.69, SD = 506.04), the catching
another staring condition (M = 416.07, SD = 229.86), and then the averted condition (M =
282.82, SD = 139.59). Simple main effects were conducted to compare the four
conditions. As hypothesized, the mutual and getting caught staring conditions were
associated with longer IA dwell time than the averted and catching another staring
conditions (p < .005 for each comparison).
These main effects were qualified, however, by a diagnosis by condition
interaction; IA dwell time differed significantly by diagnosis and condition, F(1.85,
62.89) = 11.24, p < .001 (Figure 4), confirming part of Hypothesis 2b. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that there was no significant difference on IA dwell time by
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diagnosis in the averted condition, t(34) = 1.31, p = .20. Thus, when limited social
information was presented in the stimuli (i.e. no direct gaze and no shifting gaze), the
dwell time did not differ between diagnostic groups. The diagnostic groups did differ
significantly on the amount of IA dwell time for each of the other conditions (p < .05 for
all cases), with the TD group having more dwell time than the group with ASD.

Figure 4. IA dwell time by diagnosis and condition.

3.2.2 IA Fixation Count
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of diagnosis,
F(1, 34) = 9.149, p = .005, with TD individuals making significantly more IA fixations
(M = 1.97, SD = .78) than individuals with ASD (M = 1.24, SD = .62),as hypothesized.
There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(3, 102) = 44.10, p < .001, with
the getting caught staring condition eliciting the most fixations (M =2.29, SD = .19),
followed by the mutual condition (M = 1.90, SD = .17), the catching another staring (M
= 1.22, SD = .10), and the averted condition (M = 1.02, SD = .08). As hypothesized, the
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mutual and getting caught staring conditions were associated with more IA fixations than
the averted and catching another staring conditions (p < .001 for each comparison).
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction; IA fixation count
differed significantly by diagnosis and condition, F(3, 102) = 6.180, p = .001 (Figure 5) ,
confirming part of Hypothesis 2b. The same pattern of differences occurred as with IA
dwell time. In the averted condition, the IA fixation count was not significantly different
between the two diagnostic groups, t(34) = 1.75, p = .09. As with IA dwell time, this
indicates that simply being presented with a visual stimulus that lacks self-directed gaze
attracts the same number of IA fixations regardless of diagnosis. The diagnostic groups
did differ significantly on the amount of IA fixation count for each of the other conditions
(p < .05 for all cases), with the TD group having more fixations than the group with
ASD.

Figure 5. IA fixation count by diagnosis and condition.

37

3.2.3 IA Second Fixation Duration
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of diagnosis,
F(1, 32) = 6.30, p = .02, with TD individuals displaying significantly longer IA second
fixation duration (M = 421.70 ms, SD = 101.55) than individuals with ASD (M = 338.78
ms, SD = 70.68), as hypothesized. There was also a significant main effect of condition,
F(3, 96) = 12.41, p < .001, with the mutual condition resulting in the longest IA second
fixation duration (M = 486.33 ms, SD = 237.42), followed by the getting caught staring
condition (M = 443.99 ms, SD = 207.15), the catching another staring condition (M =
335.83 ms, SD = 116.11), and then the averted condition (M = 274.35 ms, SD = 110.68).
This is not consistent with the hypothesis that the dynamic conditions (getting caught
staring and catching another staring) would result in longer IA second fixation durations.
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of diagnosis and
condition, F(3, 96) = 5.13, p = .002 (Figure 6). The differences resulting in this
significant interaction were not in the pattern hypothesized, however. One of the dynamic
conditions (catching another staring) was not significantly different between the two
diagnostic groups. Thus, in contrast to what was hypothesized, IA second fixation
duration did not differ significantly between groups based on whether or not a condition
was dynamic. It is important to note that for the group with ASD, there were no
significant differences between the IA second fixation durations across the mutual,
catching another staring, or getting caught staring conditions.
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Figure 6. IA second fixation duration by diagnosis and condition.

3.2.4 IA Pupil Size
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant interaction of condition
and diagnosis on pupil size, F(3, 99) =2.53, p = .06, nor any significant main effects of
condition, F(3, 99) = .64, p = .59 or diagnosis, F(1, 33) = .75, p = .39 (Figure 7). Thus,
arousal measured by pupil size was not affected by condition, diagnosis, or an interaction
of the two, failing to support my hypothesis.
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Figure 7. IA pupil size by diagnosis and condition.

3.2.5 RMSSD
A repeated measures ANOVA of RMSSD by condition and diagnosis was nonsignificant, F(3, 75) = 1.027, p = .385. Main effects of condition, F(3,75) = 1.775, p =
.159, and diagnosis, F(1,25) = .318, p = .578, were also non-significant (Figure 8). As
above, this demonstrates that arousal did not vary relative to diagnosis, condition, or the
interaction of the two. My hypothesis was not supported.
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Figure 8. RMSSD by diagnosis and condition.

Specific Aim 3: To establish how specific dimensionally-measured traits relate to eye
tracking and arousal outcomes, regardless of diagnosis.
3.2.6 Social Responsiveness Scale
Significant correlations emerged between the SRS Total Score and IA dwell
time more vs. less gaze difference score, IA fixation count more vs. less gaze difference
score, and IA second fixation duration more vs. less gaze difference score. Subsequently,
a regression analysis was conducted where age, sex, and IQ were entered at step one and
SRS Total Score was entered at step two. No significant models emerged (Table 3).
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Table 3. SRS Total Score Regression Results

b

SE

β

t

p

ΔR2

DV: IA dwell time, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N = 36)
F = 1.89; p = .14; df = 4; R2 = .20
Age -11.44

36.36

-.06

-.32

ns

Sex

-3.32

141.83

.00

-.02

ns

IQ

-.12

5.40

.00

-.02

ns

SRS Total Score

-5.50

2.57

-.41

-2.14

.04

.12

DV: IA fixation count, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N =
36)
F = 1.61; p = .12; df = 4; R2 = .17
Age

-.02

.07

-.06

-.29

ns

Sex

-.27

.27

-.17

-1.03

ns

IQ

.00

.01

.00

-.03

ns

SRS Total Score

-.01

.01

-.35

-1.81

ns
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(Table 3 continued)
DV: IA second fixation duration, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye
Contact a (N = 34)
F = 2.44; p = .07; df = 4; R2 = .25

a

Age

.00

.07

.00

-.02

ns

Sex

.08

.28

.05

.29

ns

IQ

-.01

.01

-.16

-.95

ns

SRS Total Score

-.01

.01

-.45

2.38

.02

.15

The scale has undergone a logarithmic transformation for these analyses

3.2.7 Theory of Mind Inventory
Significant correlations emerged between the ToMI-Total Score and IA dwell
time more vs. less gaze difference score and IA fixation count more vs. less gaze
difference score. Subsequently, a regression analysis was conducted where age, sex, and
IQ were entered at step one and ToMI-Total Score was entered at step two. No significant
models emerged (Table 4).
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Table 4. Theory of Mind Inventory- Total Score Regression Results

b

SE

β

t

ΔR2

p

DV: IA dwell time, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N = 36)
F = 1.53; p = .22; df = 4; R2 = .17
Age -13.81

37.99

-.07

Sex

21.10

114.12

IQ

-3.79

5.39

-.12

-.70

ns

ToMI- Total

95.18

52.74

.35

1.81

ns

.02

-.36
.15

ns
ns

.09

DV: IA fixation count, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N =
36)
F = 1.90; p = .14; df = 4; R2 = .20
Age

-.01

.07

-.01

-.07

ns

Sex

-.23

.26

-.15

-.90

ns

IQ

-.01

.01

-.11

-.68

ns

ToMI- Total

.20

.10

.40

2.09

.05

.11

Significant correlations emerged between the ToMI-Early Score and IA dwell
time more vs. less gaze difference score and IA fixation count more vs. less gaze
difference score. Subsequently, a regression analysis was conducted where age, sex, and
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IQ were entered at step one and ToMI-Early Score was entered at step two. No
significant models emerged (Table 5).

Table 5. Theory of Mind Inventory- Early Scale Regression Results

b

SE

β

t

p

ΔR2

DV: IA dwell time, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N = 36)
F = .72; p = .59; df = 4; R2 = .09
Age -37.27

42.51

-.19

-.88

ns

Sex 10.65

152.12

.01

.07

ns

-2.44

5.63

-.08

-.43

ns

ToMI- Early Scale 22.28

43.05

.11

.52

ns

IQ

.01

DV: IA fixation count, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N =
36)
F = 1.08; p = .38; df = 4; R2 = .12
Age

-.03

.08

-.08

-.35

ns

Sex

-.28

.28

-.17

-1.00

ns

IQ

.00

.01

-.05

-.32

ns

ToMI- Early Scale

.09

.08

.25

1.16

ns
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Significant correlations emerged between the ToMI-Advanced Score and IA
dwell time more vs. less gaze difference score, IA fixation count more vs. less gaze
difference score, IA second fixation duration more vs. less gaze difference score, and IA
pupil size more vs. less gaze difference score. Subsequently, a regression analysis was
conducted where age, sex, and IQ were entered at step one and ToMI-Advanced Score
was entered at step two. Two significant models emerged; one with IA dwell time,
difference score more vs less eye contact as the dependent variable and the other with IA
fixation count, difference score more vs less eye contact as the dependent variable (Table
6). These results indicated that more developed advanced theory of mind is associated
with greater differences in dwell time between conditions with more and less eye contact.
In conditions with more salient social information, such as those with more direct eye
contact, individuals with more advanced theory of mind are able to modulate their
looking response, such that they are looking more (longer dwell times, more fixations)
when there is more self-directed gaze.
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Table 6. Theory of Mind Inventory-Advanced Scale Regression Results

b

SE

β

t

p

ΔR2

DV: IA dwell time, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N = 36)
F = 3.24; p = .03; df = 4; R2 = .30
Age

6.87

34.80

.04

.20

ns

Sex

48.21

132.71

.06

.36

ns

IQ

-4.57

4.96

-.14

-.92

ns

38.75

.56

3.10

.004

ToMI- Advanced Scale 119.93

.2 2

DV: IA fixation count, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact (N = 36)
F = 2.94; p= .04; df = 4; R2 = .28
Age

.02

.07

.05

.27

ns

Sex

-.19

.25

-.12

-.75

ns

IQ

-.01

.01

-.13

-.82

ns

ToMI- Advanced Scale

.21

.07

.52

2.86

.007

47

.19

(Table 6 continued)
DV: IA second fixation duration, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact a
(N = 34)
F = 1.74; p = .17; df = 4; R2 = .19
Age

.00

.08

-.01

-.03

ns

Sex

.11

.29

.06

.38

ns

IQ

-.01

.01

-.22

-1.28

ns

ToMI- Advanced Scale

.16

.09

.37

1.78

ns

.09

DV: IA pupil size, Difference Score Between More and Less Eye Contact a (N = 35)
F = 1.60; p = 2.00; df = 4; R2 = .18

a

Age

.01

.01

.19

.98

Sex

.05

.05

.19

1.15

ns

IQ

.00

.00

-.01

-.07

ns

ToMI- Advanced Scale

-.02

.01

-.22

-1.12

ns

ns

The scale has undergone a logarithmic transformation for these analyses

3.2.8 Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale
No significant correlations emerged between the fear/anxiety and avoidance
ratings for Item #19 (“Looking at people you don’t know very well in the eyes”) on the
LSAS and any of the eye tracking or arousal difference scores. Thus, no models were run.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
The prevalence of autism spectrum disorders appears to continue to increase
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Nygren et al., 2012). With social deficits
causing significant impairment across work, home life, and peer groups, a more
comprehensive understanding of these deficits is required for accurate screening and
effective intervention. With differences in facial scanning and other gaze behavior
relative to diagnostic status being well-established, the goal of this study was to isolate
one particular component of social perception and to quantify how this component
presents in individuals with and without ASD. The stare-in-the-crowd effect plays an
important role in social interactions. Noticing and reacting to gaze is necessary to start
these interactions, to modulate their continuation, and to cue the ending. The findings
from this study allow us to better understand how the stare-in-the-crowd effect is affected
by ASD.
Two analytic approaches were used to examine the data: categorical and
dimensional. The categorical analyses revealed that the interaction of diagnosis and
condition significantly affected gaze behavior. The overall trend was that gaze behavior
was greatest for conditions with more self-directed gaze, such as the mutual and getting
caught staring conditions, with individuals with ASD looking less than TD individuals.
For the conditions with less self-directed gaze, such as the averted and catching another
staring condition, the differences between the two diagnostic groups were either nonexistent or much less pronounced than in the conditions with more self-directed gaze.
Dimensional analyses illustrated that some traits related to ASD were not as strongly
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related to gaze behavior and arousal as hypothesized. Only one scale, ToMI-Advanced,
was a significant predictor of any gaze behavior or arousal outcomes.
4.1 ANOVA and Eye Tracking
For IA dwell time and IA fixation count, there was a significant effect of both diagnosis
and condition on these two outcome measures. The latter significant finding allowed an
examination of hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. The amount of self-directed gaze
(averted/catching another staring vs. mutual/getting caught staring) was related to less
looking in the averted/catching another staring conditions than in the mutual/getting
caught staring conditions. This pattern was also observed for the IA second duration
fixation, which contradicts hypothesis 1b and part of 2c; significant differences were
predicted between the stable and dynamic conditions instead of between conditions with
more and less self-directed gaze. It is likely that a combination of factors caused this
outcome. The first is that self-directed gaze is more noticeable or “of interest” than
shifting gaze. The other is that, since there were not significant differences in the second
fixation duration across conditions for individuals with ASD, this eye tracking measure
does not reflect social response to visual stimuli for these individuals. This can inform
future work, as discussed below.
There was a significant interaction between diagnosis and condition found for IA
dwell time, IA fixation count, and IA second fixation duration. Across variables, TD
individuals generally responded with more looking behaviors in conditions with more
self-directed gaze, followed by conditions with shifting gaze. However, across variables,
individuals with ASD did not differ significantly from the TD group in looking behavior
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in the averted condition. When there is a lack of socially salient information, all
individuals viewed the stimuli similarly. This shows that diagnostic differences on other
gaze variables are not simply reflecting that individuals with ASD are looking less at the
stimuli than the TD individuals; the social saliency of the images draws different looking
reactions.
All individuals spent more time looking at self-directed gaze than averted gaze;
the pattern of gaze behavior by condition looked similar across diagnostic groups.
Overall, the individuals with ASD were responding in what could be described as a
“muted” version of the responses of the TD individuals. Closer examination of
differences between conditions or types of conditions (e.g. dynamic vs. stable, more vs.
less self-directed gaze) uncovers additional details about potential factors driving these
differences.
Between the direct gaze conditions, there was increased visual attention in the
dynamic condition in the TD group but less of an increase in the group with ASD. This
finding is consistent with the literature. Bockler et al (2014a) found a significant
difference of the impact of gaze on subsequent looking behaviors between individuals
with and without ASD. When visual stimuli provided social cues via eye gaze, such as
people looking in a particular direction, TD individuals would notice this and respond
appropriately, looking in that direction. Thus, when a picture appeared in that same spot
moments later, TD individuals were quickly able to identify that object. When shown the
same image with social cues via eye gaze, individuals with ASD did not alter their
behavior to react appropriately by following the gaze. As a result, they less quickly
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identified pictures that appeared where the people in the image had been looking. The
conclusion here is that individuals with ASD did not appear to be interpreting the social
information from the gaze of the faces and modulating behavior based on this. For the
current study, dynamic gaze should elicit different looking patterns, since this shift
provides social information. TD individuals would change their behavior accordingly,
looking more at dynamic conditions than stable conditions with similar amounts of selfdirected gaze. Individuals with ASD exhibited some different looking patterns but the
differences were not as dramatic. Thus, the muted gaze behavior response from the ASD
group is consistent with an impairment in recognizing the social saliency of gaze, and the
appropriate social response (i.e., increased looking). Reacting to differences in the images
would elicit some increased looking in certain conditions, as evidenced by these data, but
it is the lack of integration of this information into an appropriate response that illustrates
some of the social communication deficits observed in ASD.
As mentioned above, across the eye tracking variables, there were not significant
differences by diagnosis for the averted condition. When there was minimal socially
relevant information, or when no gaze was directed at the viewer, a diagnosis of ASD did
not affect how the scene was viewed. This is important because it demonstrates that, at
least for individuals with high functioning ASD, straightforward perception of faces is
not necessarily impaired. Rather, once there is socially salient information to recognize,
interpret, and respond to, group differences by diagnosis begin to emerge.
Another important point of consideration from these analyses is that the IA
second fixation duration did not vary significantly across most of the conditions for the
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individuals with ASD. Although there was a significant difference in IA second fixation
duration between the averted and mutual conditions, comparisons demonstrated that the
IA second fixation duration was not significantly different for individuals with ASD
between the mutual, catching another staring, and getting caught staring conditions. This
is not consistent with the significant conditions differences observed for IA dwell time
and IA fixation count in the ASD group. Therefore, IA second fixation duration appears
not to be a sensitive measure of response to the stare-in-the-crowd effect for individuals
with ASD. In combination with the IA dwell time and IA fixation count results, this
suggests that the initial reactions (such as the second fixation) to social information are
impaired in individuals with ASD. Moving the awareness of social information earlier
into the perceptual process may be a key step in implementing interventions to improve
perception of and reaction to social information.
The identified differences in gaze behavior confirms that individuals with ASD, at
least adults with high-functioning ASD, are susceptible to the stare-in-the-crowd effect.
Their pattern of looking in response to self-directed gaze (i.e. looking more often and
longer at gaze that is self-directed versus averted) is similar to that of TD individuals but
the differences between the conditions were less. Thus, individuals with ASD are indeed
noticing and responding to mutual gaze differently than averted gaze. The extent of their
reaction or gaze behavior is not reaching some critical threshold, however, and this has a
number of implications for intervention possibilities, as outlined below.
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4.2 ANOVA and Arousal
Hypotheses about physiological arousal as measured by RMSSD and IA pupil size were
not confirmed for any condition groups (Hypothesis 1c, part of 2a, part of 2c). There
were no main effects of diagnosis or condition on RMSSD or IA pupil size. The lack of
differences in physiological arousal (and lack of difference by condition) can be
interpreted in several ways. At first glance, it is possible that these analyses were
underpowered due to missing data. Another possibility is that that there truly are not
differences in arousal based on stable or dynamic gaze.
The novelty of the dynamic paradigms utilized in this study make direct
comparison to other studies in this area difficult, but there are clues from studies using
similar diagnostic status (ASD vs. TD) along with mutual vs. averted gaze suggesting
that there may not be an effect of an ASD diagnosis on arousal. In a study of 12-19 year
olds, Louwerse et al. (2013) used images of neutral faces displaying direct or averted
gaze, or closed eyes, and found no difference in heart rate relative to diagnostic status or
mutual vs. averted gaze. Similarly, a recent study of toddlers by Nuske and colleagues
(2015) found that pupil size did not differ significantly based on ASD status but did differ
relative to amount of self-directed gaze.
A second possibility is that differences in physiological arousal do exist yet our
method of assessing them was not optimal. Heart rate variability and pupil size have been
used previously and successfully to measure response to social scenes (e.g., Martineau et
al., 2011 or Sepeta et al., 2012), but so have other measures, such as galvanic skin
response, or skin conductance. For instance, in a study of children, skin conductance was
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found to be a significant indicator of arousal in children with and without ASD
(Kylliainen & Hietanen, 2006). Perhaps had we examined skin conductance we may have
observed significant differences on arousal measures.
4.3 Regression with Behavioral Measures
The regressions yielded fewer significant results than anticipated. There were no
significant models of the eye tracking or physiological arousal variables using the Social
Responsiveness Scale, which contradicts my hypothesis. There were significant group
differences on this measure but analyzing this measure as a continuous variable showed
no associations with IA dwell time, IA fixation count, IA second fixation duration, IA
pupil size, or RMSSD. These null findings can be interpreted in a few ways. One possible
explanation is that the significant group differences are clustered around different means
and not continuously distributed. There have been a number of studies on the normal
distribution of autistic traits in the population and, more specifically, a normal
distribution of social responsiveness as measured by the SRS (Constantino & Todd,
2003). For instance, instead of viewing social awareness (a subscale of the SRS) as a trait
that either is present or not, Constantino and Todd demonstrated that such traits exist
along a spectrum within the general population. Following this model, one might
reasonably suppose that behaviors related to ASD, such as gaze behavior, would also be
normally distributed in the population. This has not yet been established. However, the
unsuccessful attempt to assess the association between social responsiveness and gaze
behavior suggests that the shape of the distribution of each of these in the population is
different. This could be a reflection of our recruited participants (see Strengths and
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Weaknesses section for further discussion) or could indicate that impairment in gaze
behavior are better described categorically.
For the Theory of Mind Inventory, two significant models emerged, with the
advanced scale being a significant predictor of IA dwell time and IA fixation count
difference scores between conditions with more and less self-directed gaze. Given the
high level of functioning in our sample (many of the participants were enrolled in
college), it is not surprising that within the Theory of Mind Inventory, the advanced scale
is the only factor associated with gaze behavior. This factor of the ToMI taps into
understanding sarcasm, white lies, second order of belief (i.e., I recognize that you might
have feelings about another person’s feelings), and social judgment. Lower scores on this
scale would indicate less developed social judgment, a critical component in recognizing
and reacting appropriately to gaze (Hutchins, Prelock, & Bouyea, 2014). Larger changes
in looking in the interest areas of these visual stimuli (as measured by dwell time or
fixation count) between conditions with more and less self-directed gaze indicates the
participant is changing their looking reactions appropriately when someone is looking at
them versus not. Individuals with more developed advanced theory of mind exhibited
bigger differentials between conditions with more mutual gaze compared to conditions
with less mutual gaze.
The items relating to looking behavior on the LSAS separately (Item #19
“Looking at people you don't know very well in the eyes”) was not significantly
associated with any eye tracking or arousal outcomes. The literature examining the starein-the-crowd effect and social anxiety appears to be underexplored. This preliminary
56

investigation suggests that this particular item on the LSAS may not capture reactions to
self-directed gaze in a simulated setting, or relative to the stare-in-the-crowd effect. In
individuals with ASD, about 7% of individuals also meet full DSM-IV criteria for social
anxiety (Leyfer et al., 2006). This high rate of comorbidity combined with the knowledge
that social anxiety and gaze detection is a rich area of study, surveying for these traits in a
study of social perception in ASD is vitally important to understand results in a
meaningful way.
One possible explanation for the lack of significant results is that the measures
used in this study are not capturing the aspect of ASD that influences gaze behavior and
physiological arousal (or at least the self-report versions of these measures). Other
examples of self-report measures in studies of ASD are uncommon and either the
questionnaire itself or the respondent format may not be a good fit for this population or
phenomenon. The behavioral measures chosen were similar to those used in other studies,
however, so it is also possible that a dimensional approach to breaking down the stare-inthe-crowd effect is simply not the most informative analytic approach.
4.4 Correlations
Although the regressions did not yield robust significant results, a number of
significant correlations emerged. Overall, comparisons of eye tracking measures related
to the amount of self-directed gaze in an image were significantly correlated to the ToMI
subscales and the SRS and no correlations with LSAS item #19 were observed. Higher
scores on the ToMI scales (indicating more developed theory of mind) were associated
with more looking, including increased fixations and longer looking durations. Higher
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scores on the SRS (indicating more impaired social responsiveness) were associated with
less looking. These correlations suggest that there is an association between some traits
relating to ASD that warrant further exploration with a larger sample size and more
normal distributions of responses to these behavioral questionnaires. When including
additional variables (age, sex, and IQ), many of the models using significantly correlated
behavioral measures were not significant. This indicates that our a priori selection of
these variables was not well informed.
4.5 Research Applications
The design of this study fits with the National Institutes of Health Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. Under the “Systems for Social Processes” heading in
the RDoC matrix, this project examined the following constructs: social communication
(reception of and production of facial communication) and perception and understanding
of others (animacy and action perception), and the following domains: cognitive systems
(visual perception) and arousal and regulatory systems (arousal) (NIMH Research
Domain Criteria, 2011).
Although the recruitment strategy targeted two diagnostic groups, the behavioral
measures, eye tracking outcomes, and autonomic arousal data were also analyzed
continuously, as has been done previously for other psychopathologies. For instance,
individuals with ADHD have demonstrated difficulties in some social responsiveness
domains (Reiersen, Constantino, Volk, & Todd, 2007). Although models with the SRS
were not significant, correlations between the SRS and the eye tracking measures were
significant. Thus, the findings from this study relating to ASD may have utility in
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understanding social perception deficits in other disorders; if we know individuals with
ADHD exhibit limited social responsiveness, this may inform our understanding of how
these stare-in-the-crowd results would generalize beyond ASD.
By identifying models of the stare-in-the-crowd effect based on behavioral and
autonomic data, this paradigm may be adapted to be clinically useful. Klin’s group at the
Marcus Autism Center in Georgia is developing an eye contact chart, similar to a height
or weight growth chart for children, identifying the trajectories of developing eye contact.
Because gaze detection abilities develop so early, gaze detection paradigms provide a
unique opportunity for very early screening (Jones & Klin, 2013). When we know more
specifically how this stare-in-the-crowd effect relates to theory of mind, social
responsiveness, and social anxiety in adults (as proposed here) and in children (a
potential next step), we can work backwards to develop screening tools for deficits before
they occur. Additionally, given the importance of the stare-in-the-crowd effect,
presenting this paradigm pre and post intervention could contribute to developing
empirically-based programs.
4.6 Clinical Applications
Hwang and Hughes (2000) reviewed 16 empirical studies and found numerous
examples of positive effects of social interventions on eye gaze behavior and joint
attention, specifically when interventions employed the “time delay” technique (i.e.
waiting continually longer periods of time before prompting individuals to engage in a
desired task or behavior, then reinforcing; Neitzel & Wolery, 2009). Imitation of others
generally appears to be a strong predictor of changed eye gaze behavior. This modeling
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could be done in person (Harris, Handleman, & Fong, 1987; Tiegerman & Primavera,
1984) or there is exciting new work being done exploring the potential of modalities such
as video modeling on social behavior (Kourassanis, Jones, & Fienup, 2015). Thus, there
are empirically-based techniques which have been shown to affect changes in social
behavior in ASD. The results of this study demonstrate that there is a base level of
appropriately modulated response to mutual and dynamic gaze. Building on these
already-present skills using the techniques outlined above will serve individuals with
ASD (or social impairments more generally) in detecting and responding to gaze, which
has implications for a range of social behaviors. Knowing that individuals with ASD are
already reacting to the gaze conditions differently provides a good starting point from
which to develop more nuanced skills. As outlined previously, the knowledge that the
second fixation duration does not reflect the same modulation in reaction to condition can
inform targets for these interventions. Individuals with ASD are demonstrating
appropriate increased looking in response to self-directed or shifting gaze, as evidenced
by IA dwell time and IA fixation count. However, the increased looking must not happen
as quickly as it does for the TD individuals as these same differences are not observed in
the IA second fixation duration. Increasing looking (such as IA dwell time and IA
fixation count) and moving this increased looking earlier in the perceptual timeline are
key important starting points for interventions moving forward.
In sum, the stare-in-the-crowd effect has implications that are dependent on the
context of that gaze detection and on the clinical presentation of participating individuals.
There are two primary objectives achieved by clarifying how autistic and social anxiety
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traits, categorical diagnosis, and eye gaze condition are related to gaze behaviors and
arousal. First, empirically-informed interventions targeting specific deficits can be
developed. Second, our understanding of social impairment in individuals with ASD is
clarified in relation to gaze detection, a critical aspect of human social interactions.
4.7 Future Steps
Currently, we are recruiting pre-school and school-aged children with ASD to
observe how this effect presents in younger children. This will inform the beginnings of a
model of gaze detection development. Moving forward, I would like to incorporate
different methods of data collection, including galvanic skin response and fMRI or EEG.
There is already a sizable literature measuring and localizing brain activity in response to
gaze. Specific facets of gaze behavior, such as joint attention, have already been found to
be associated with activation in particular brain regions. For instance, Schilbach et al.
(2010) found that the ventral striatum is activated when an individual directs someone
else’ gaze to an object; findings relating to this specific component of social gaze
behavior suggest that the stare-in-the-crowd effect may be driven by a specific region of
interest, which could then be compared relative to psychopathological traits. And we
would similarly expect that the stare-in-the-crowd effect would elicit neural activity that
may vary relative to autistic traits. Further, adding in a question about the participants’
reactions to shifting gaze (e.g. “Why do you think the person looked away?”) would be
interesting in the context of ASD but also related to schizophrenia, depression, or anxiety.
Moreover, I would like to incorporate these findings into social interventions.
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4.8 Strengths and Weaknesses
As with any study, this one is not without limitations. The reliance on self-report
of symptoms, the limited sample size, and functioning level of individuals in the ASD
group are all points to consider. The use of self-report for the questionnaires is both a
strength and a weakness. This highlighted how individuals view themselves and how
these perceptions are associated with eye movements and physiological arousal.
Anecdotally, especially in response to some of the social responsiveness and theory of
mind questions, there may be a discrepancy between an individual’s actual social
responsiveness, for instance, and their self-perception of that trait, particularly in the
group with ASD. For instance, many individuals with ASD asked for clarification of the
phrase “Picking someone up”, wondering if that meant physically lifting someone else
and not understanding that “picking someone up” was an idiom in a social or romantic
context. Once this was clarified, many of these individuals then rated themselves as near
perfect on their ability to recognize and understand idioms. Having a parent, close
companion, or significant other complete the questionnaires may result in different
ratings, that are potentially less positively inflated which may have resulted in different
regression findings in particular. However, the perspective of young adults with ASD on
their own functioning is an important point to consider and thus, from an inclusion
perspective, this type of data collection is an area in need of further exploration and
norming. Perhaps collecting and comparing significant other- and self-report data on
these measures in the future will be useful in guiding how these results are interpreted.
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Due to recruitment challenges, the number of individuals with ASD who were
recruited is less than originally proposed. Although significant effects were still
identified, it is possible that the lack of more participants in the ASD group left the study
underpowered to detect additional effects. For example, on the two measures of arousal
(IA pupil size and RMSSD), differences between means existed between diagnostic
groups and between conditions but these failed to reach the criterion level of significance.
Future studies should either aim to include more participants or to recruit individuals
within a wider range of ASD presentations to more fully capture the continuous nature of
autistic traits.
Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, and Nicewander (2005) critiqued the “extreme
groups approach” (EGA) used in the first part of this study. Comparing the two
diagnostic groups on these variables was important given the current work being done on
stare-in-the-crowd effect. Despite its wide reaching implications, this effect is not well
studied in the literature and there has not yet been a study establishing how the stare-inthe-crowd effect presents in individuals with ASD. By using this EGA, it is possible that
the significant effects found here are overestimates of the actual phenomenon. However,
most of the individuals recruited into the ASD group were, in fact, quite high functioning.
Thus, our group comparisons are not between two drastic ends of the spectrum. This still
may lead to overestimation of effects but the recruitment criteria (IQ and ability to
answer questionnaires/sit still during an eye tracking task, tolerate electrodes being stuck
to their chest and back) did select out individuals on the more severe end of the autism
spectrum.
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Preacher et al. offer a number of recommendations if EGA is used that were
followed. Specifically, groupings were made prior to data collection or statistical
analysis, not afterward. By also testing regression models of these outcomes, I do in fact
address one of their concerns about this approach, namely that analyses relying solely on
extreme groups may lead to misestimating of effects. Since continuous measurement of
traits of interest relative to eye tracking and arousal outcomes are also analyzed here, the
potential for misspecification decreases.
The fact that the individuals with ASD recruited for this study were mainly highfunctioning is, again, a strength and a weakness. The eye tracking system we used would
be feasible in a study of lower functioning individuals but the calibration and validation
procedures would be markedly more difficult. By relying on higher functioning
individuals, we may not be detecting gaze effects that are related to individuals with
lower cognitive and linguistic abilities. However, given that we still observed the starein-the-crowd effect in individuals with less impairments, it seems reasonable to expect
that these effects would be even further magnified for individuals who have more severe
traits of ASD.
4.9 Conclusion
Overall, self-directed gaze elicits more looking from viewers, regardless of
whether or not they had ASD or if the images shifted. Establishing a baseline for how
symptom presentation affects gaze detection and reactions is important to inform
interventions that build upon pre-existing abilities. The lack of significant associations
between arousal and stare-in-the-crowd conditions was unexpected. Assessing different
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measures of physiological arousal in future studies may reveal positive findings that were
not accessed by the means used here, or perhaps increased looking with limited arousal is
a characteristic of gaze detection. This study describes the stare-in-the-crowd effect by
varying conditions that have been largely unexplored in the literature. Especially as social
interventions for individuals with ASD (and other types of psychopathology) become
more sophisticated, it is my hope that findings such as these can inform tailored
interventions that address specific impairments in social perception.
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APPENDIX
Graphs of hypotheses 1 a-c and 2 b-c
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staring
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another
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Hypothesis 1a: Interest area dwell time and interest area fixation count will be greater in
conditions with more self-directed gaze (mutual and getting caught staring) than less (averted
and catching another staring)

Mutual

Averted

Getting
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staring

Catching
another
staring

Hypothesis 1b: Second fixation duration will be greater for dynamic conditions (getting
caught staring and catching another staring) than stable conditions (mutual and averted)
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Mutual

Averted
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STABLE
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DYNAMIC

Hypothesis 1c: Arousal (increased HRV and pupil dilation) will be greater in dynamic
conditions (getting caught staring and catching another staring) than stable conditions
(mutual and averted)

B

Two eye
tracking
measures
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fixation
count,)
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Getting caught staring
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SELF-DIRECTED

NOT SELF-DIRECTED

Hypothesis 2b: For two of the eye tracking measures (IA dwell time, IA fixation count), there
will be an interaction between diagnosis and relative amount of self-directed gaze
(mutual/getting caught staring conditions vs averted/catching another staring conditions), with
the eye tracking measures being greater in the TD group than in the ASD group.
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Hypothesis 2c: For second fixation duration and arousal (heart rate and pupil size), there will
be an interaction between diagnosis and change (mutual/averted conditions vs getting caught
staring/catching another staring), with second fixation duration and arousal being greater in
the TD group than in the ASD group.
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